yuksekten sallamayi seven bir amca olan george friedman
ara ara 100 yil sonra ne olacagini tahmin etmeyi sever. genelde "hadi lenn" dediginiz laflari olsa da, bazen abd'nin emperyalist duzeninin i$leme detaylarina da deginir. bunlardan mantigimiza siganlari aktaralim:
the us is secure from attack on land or sea. it is vulnerable to terrorist attack but, outside of a nuclear exchange, faces no existential threat in the sense that britain and france did in 1940-41, or germany and japan did in 1944-45. part of its advantage is that, alone among the combatants, the us actually profited from the second world war, emerging with a thoroughly modernised industrial base. but this itself can be traced to the country's core geography. the fertility of the land between the appalachians and the rocky mountains, and the configuration of the country's river system, drove an economic system in the 19th century that helped fund an economy which today constitutes between 25 and 30 per cent of global economic activity, depending on how you value the dollar.
just as important, perhaps, is that while the population density of japan is about 365 people per square kilometre and that of most european states between 100 and 300 per square kilometre, the us population density, excluding alaska, is about 34 people per square kilometre. the us has room to grow and it manages immigration well. its population is not expected to decline. it is the pre-eminent power not because of the morality of the regime, the virtue of its people or the esteem in which it is held, but because of europe's failures and changes in global trade patterns.
the us marshals the economic resources of north america, controls the world's oceans and space, projects force where it wishes - wisely or not. the us is to the world what britain once was to europe. both nations depended on control of the sea to secure their interests. both nations understood that the best way to retain control of the sea was to prevent other nations from building navies. both understood that the best way to do that was to maintain a balance of power in which potential challengers spent their resources fighting each other on land, rather than building fleets that could challenge their control of the sea.
the us is doing this globally. its primary goal is always to prevent the emergence of a single power that can dominate eurasia and the european peninsula. with the soviet union's collapse, china's limits and the eu's divisions, there is currently no threat of this. so the us has moved to a secondary goal, which is to block the emergence of any regional hegemon that could, in the long term, grow into something more dangerous. the us does what it can to disrupt the re-emergence of russian national power while building relations with bordering countries such as poland and turkey. it encourages unrest in china's border regions, using the ideology of human rights as justification. it conducts direct or surrogate wars on a seemingly random basis, from somalia to serbia, from iraq to afghanistan.
many of these wars appear to go badly. however, success is measured not by the pacification of a country, but by its disruption. to the extent that the eurasian land mass is disrupted, to the extent that there is perpetual unrest and disunion from the atlantic to the pacific, the us has carried out its mission. iraq is paradigmatic. the us intervention resulted in a civil war. what appeared to be a failure was, in fact, a satisfactory outcome. subjectively, we would think george w bush and his critics were unaware of this. but that is the point of geopolitics. the imperatives generate ideologies (a democratic iraq) and misconceptions (weapons of mass destruction). these, however, are shadows on the wall. it is the geopolitical imperatives, not the rhetoric, that must be understood in order to make sense of what is going on.
thus, the question is how these geopolitical and strategic realities shape the rest of the century. eurasia, broadly understood, is being hollowed out. china is far weaker than it appears and is threatened with internal instability. the europeans are divided by old national patterns that prevent them from moving in a uniform direction. russia is using the window of opportunity presented by the us absorption in disrupting the islamic world to reclaim its sphere of influence in the former soviet union, but its underlying weakness will reassert itself over the next generation.
the united states conducts an incautious foreign policy. the relative power of the us is such that it has a margin of error far beyond that of the countries it confronts. it also has a strategic disruptive imperative, based on geopolitical interests. this will make the planet an uncomfortable place, particular for rising powers.
there is another dimension built into us foreign policy - using subordinate regional powers as surrogates, exchanging their willingness to incur risks from a major power opposed to the us for substantial benefits. these range from strategic guarantees and support against smaller neighbours to trade advantages and technology transfers. the recovery of west germany and japan during the cold war are classic examples of this. there are three nations that are already major or emerging regional powers that will be important to the us in dealing with russia in the next decade or so: japan, turkey and poland.
us strategy considers any great power with significant maritime capabilities a threat; it will have solved one problem - the russian problem - by generating another. imagining a japanese-turkish alliance is strange but no stranger than a japanese-german alliance in 1939. both countries will be under tremendous pressure from the established power. both will have an interest in overthrowing the global regime the us has imposed. the risk of not acting will be greater than the risk of acting. that is the basis of war.