birinci kismi, giris niteligindedir ama butun onemli fikirler listelenmistir. mesela kanuni duzenlemelerin disinda, etik-ahlaki-geleneksel degerlerin de azinliklara ve muhaliflere empoze edilmesinin tehlikesinden bahsedilmistir. yani kisisel sadece kanun onunde ezilmemeli, ayni zamanda cogunlugun degerlerine de teslim olmak zorunda olmamalidirlar. aksi halde cogunlugu, (aslinda pluralityi) ele geciren degerler sistemi, buyuyen cig gibi diger herseyi yutacaktir. burada mill'in goruslerinin en temeline variyoruz, yani zihnin ozgurlugune. zaten ifade ozgurlugunden de once, tabularla, sartlandirilmalarla sinirlanmamis ozgur dusunebilme yetisinin ustune basar.
bir baska fikir de, toplumun (sadece devletin degil, yani cogunlugun devlet araciligiyla da, gelenekler ve degerler araciligiyla da) salt kisiyi ilgilendiren ve baskalarina ciddi ve direkt bir yansimasi olmayan konularda, o kisiye en ufak sekilde dahi karismamasi gerektigidir. bu mudahalenin, sozde, o kisinin iyiligi icin olmasi hicbirseyi degistirmez. yani ornegin, genc bir insanin intihar ozgurlugu olmali (kucuk cocuguna bakmakla yukumlu bir anne ise o kadar ozgur degil). goruldugu gibi esas olan, kisinin digerlerine verdigi zarardir, akli melekeleri yerinde ise bedeni ve zihni uzerindeki hicbir hakkinda hicbir yolla etki edilemez.
buyrun, ilk kisimdan, sevdigim bolumlerin alintilari:
the notion, that the people have no need to limit their power over themselves, might seem axiomatic, when popular government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of the past. neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the french revolution... the ‘people’ who exercise the power, are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised, and the ‘self-government’ spoken of, is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. the will of the people, moreover, practically means, the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people... the limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals, loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community..‘the tyranny
of the majority’ is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.
there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose
, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them [burasi cok onemliydi iste]
[those in advance of society] have occupied themselves rather in inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a law to individuals. they preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular points on which they were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in defence of freedom, with heretics generally
the great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for his religious belief. yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about, that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. in the minds of almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves.
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. his own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant...in the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute
. over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign
despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. but as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction
(a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion
, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.
to make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception. yet there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that exception.
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. the liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.
ancient philosophers countenanced, the regulation of every part of private conduct by public authority, on the ground that the state had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental discipline of every one of its citizens, a mode of thinking which may have been admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies, in constant peril of being subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion, and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so easily be fatal, that they could not afford to wait for the salutary permanent effects of freedom. in the modern world, the greater size of political communities, and above all, the separation between the spiritual and temporal authority (which placed the direction of men's consciences in other hands than those which controlled their worldly affairs), prevented so great an interference by law in the details of private life; but the engines of moral repression have been wielded more strenuously against divergence from the reigning opinion in self-regarding, than even in social matters; religion, the most powerful of the elements which have entered into the formation of moral feeling, having almost always been governed either by the ambition of a hierarchy, seeking control over every department of human conduct