majestelerine biat etmediği için otoriter ve anti-semitik delikanlıların hakaretlerine maruz kalan analist.
türkiye'yi bir korku cumhuriyeti'ne benzetmiş son yazısında.
soyismi nüfus memurunun azizliğine uğramış gibi.
cnn turk'teki programda sykes ve picot'un donemin ingiliz ve fransiz disisleri bakani oldugunu soylemis sahis (ikisi de bakan degildi). ayrica ruslardan ve iranlilardan "kotuler" diye soz etti.
muhtesem tarafsizlikta ve derinlikte analizler yapiyor. ortadogu konusunda en buyuk uzmanimiz bu arkadas ise dis politikamizin facia olmasina sasirmamak gerek. buyuk devlet olmak boyle bir sey olsa gerek.
erken cumhuriyet döneminde yurttaşlık-iskan-nüfus mühendisliği, etnisite, milliyetçilik üzerine yazdıklarından biliyordum. meğerse reel-politik sularında da yüzmekteymiş.
islam, secularism, and nationalism in modern turkey who is a turk, routledge, 2006. yale tarih’te 1996-2002, yazdığı doktora tezinden türettiği kitabı.
“citizenship policies in interwar turkey”, nations and nationalism 9 (4), 2003
“reconfiguring the turkish nation in the 1930s”, nationalism and ethnic politics 8 (2), 2002
“race, assimilation and kemalism turkish nationalism and the minorities in the 1930s”, middle eastern studies, 40 (3), 2004
“kim türk, kim vatandaş? erken cumhuriyet dönemi vatandaşlık rejimi üzerine bir çalışma”, çev: pemra hazbay, toplum ve bilim no. 98, 2003
“kemalist dönemde göç ve iskan politikaları: türk kimliği üzerine bir çalışma”, çev: defne orhun, toplum ve bilim no. 93, 2002
valla ve sanırım, birine biat edip etmediği meselesi öncelikle majestesine bakar.
son yazısında türk modelinin arap modeli için örnek olamayacağından bahsediyor ve müslümanlığı kullanan akp'nin daha radikal guruplar tarafından gittikçe nasıl radikelleştiğini anlatıyor. kısaca turkiye için tehlike çanları çalıyor. http://online.wsj.com/….html?mod=wsj_share_facebook
ilginç bir yazı daha. karanfil devrimi sonrası portekiz'le mısır arasında bir bağlantı kuruyor sanırım ve türkiye'nin arap dünyasında geçmişte portekiz'de almanya'nın oynadığı role benzer bir rol oynaması gerektiğinden bahsediyor.
portuguese lessons for turkey’s role in the arab spring
on april 25, 1974, the “carnation revolution” shook portugal’s 48-year-old dictatorship. a group of army officers, joined by the masses and underground communist movement, rebelled against the regime. surprisingly, the dictatorship collapsed like a house of cards.
portugal, then ridden by poverty, illiteracy and authoritarianism, found itself at a crossroads: military rule or communist takeover. but neither happened. thanks to the often untold story of efforts by germany’s social democratic party (spd) government and the stiftungs (ngos linked to germany’s political parties) to build centrist forces in lisbon, the unexpected occurred: portugal became a democracy.
portugal in the 1970s parallels today’s arab spring. arab countries, similarly poor and undemocratic, also stand at a crossroads, faced with the choice between military rule and an illiberal (in this case radical islamist) takeover.
in the 1970s, germany’s spd, the first elected social-democratic government in bonn, had the ability to uphold social democracy as a legitimate alternative to communism in lisbon. turkey can play a similar role in the middle east today if ankara’s first islamist-rooted and democratically-elected party, the akp, encourages alternatives to radical islamist parties.
in 1974, portugal lacked deep democratic traditions and a sizable middle class. the powerful communist movement stood ready to hijack the revolution, while the military – which took charge after the dictatorship – seemed lost. the situation looked bleak. only a few years later, however, portugal blossomed as a democracy and later entered the european union. it is now one of the world’s most liberal democracies.
to facilitate this, the german government strategically built a political center in portugal: the spd literally helped found the portuguese socialist party (ps), a social-democratic movement that called for a democratic portugal and the defeat of communist efforts to take power, in bad munstereifel, germany.
furthermore, germany took the lead in organizing the “friendship solidarity committee for portuguese democracy and socialism” in august 1975. led by german chancellor willy brandt, this committee included leading european social democrats, such as swedish prime minister olof palme and austrian chancellor bruno kreisky, and became a platform in which social democrats shared knowledge with the ps and developed strategies for successful democratic transformation. the committee also prepared the groundwork for portugal’s eu membership.
the german stiftungs, too, performed a valuable function. spd-affiliated friedrich ebert stiftung (fes) provided financial assistance to the ps. fes alone donated 10 to 15 million german marks for campaign training and the funding of ps leaders’ travel, using discrete swiss bank accounts to facilitate monetary transfers. stiftungs connected to liberal and conservative german parties built counterparts in portugal, as well.
today, turkey could play germany’s role in arab countries, as tall an order as that might sound. first, ankara needs to shine as an example of liberal democracy. to this end, the turks need to use the debate on writing a new constitution to draft an exemplary liberal charter.
even then, ankara needs help to play germany’s role. just as bonn received financial and political assistance from the united states and other democracies in building portuguese democracy, turkey would benefit from support from the west as well as other muslim-majority democracies, such as indonesia, especially in creating “turkish stiftungs,” the missing part of the germany-turkey parallel.
and let’s not forget the eu’s soft power in promoting portugal’s liberal democracy; today, when there is no such force for the arab world, can turkey help create it?
the road will be rough: whereas many portuguese welcomed the germans, i heard from arabs of all political stripes at the abant platform’s recent conference on the arab spring in turkey that “arabs will not applaud their former imperial ruler’s direct intervention.”
ankara’s efforts to play germany in the arab world will have to be extremely gentle, and its success cannot be taken for granted. it might still be worth a try, though. the “carnation revolution” suggests democracy can take root in the most unexpected places if the necessary outside support is provided.
türkiye'nin suriye politikasıyla ilgili önemli bir yazı kaleme almış.
what drives turkey's new syria stance? a fear of two kurdistans
cnn global public square
may 23, 2012
when the syrian uprising began last spring, turkey initially stayed behind washington. it shied away from criticizing the regime of bashar al-assad, instead asking al-assad to reform.
when damascus refused, however, ankara moved ahead of washington, taking an aggressive posture against al-assad and suggesting it was ready to take action to force him to step down.
recently, though, ankara has backpedaled, abandoning its aggression and sliding back toward washington's position. with this, turkey has entered the third phase of its syrian policy, falling nearly in line with washington's policy of "wait and see and hope for an orderly transition -- for now."
what could explain turkey's new posture? many factors come to mind, from the fear of getting bogged down in a war with a neighboring country to being left alone to fight al-assad. but one key factor is its fear of two kurdistans.
syria's restless and well-organized kurdish minority, for the most part, does not trust turkey. instead, the syrian kurds are looking to their counterparts in iraq's kurdish region, the middle east's first autonomous kurdish political entity. some syrian kurdish leaders aspire to gain what the iraqi kurds have: their own kurdistan.
turkey can deal with one kurdistan, but two might be too many.
in recent years, ankara's policy with the iraqi kurds has evolved from open hostility in 2003, when the iraqi kurds built their kurdistan, to open friendship today.
in this regard, the iraqi kurds have helped turkey by embracing a crucial strategy: since 2003, the iraqi kurds have gradually abandoned their policy of turning a blind eye to the presence of the kurdistan workers party (pkk), a turkish kurdish terror group that fights turkey inside northern iraq.
as far as turkey is concerned, anyone who hosts the pkk is an enemy. seeing this plain fact, the iraqi kurds sacrificed the pkk to ally with turkey against iraq's increasingly authoritarian central government in baghdad.
as soon as the iraqi kurds showed good will on the pkk issue, ankara reciprocated, building good ties with the iraqi kurdish regional government in erbil. today, turkey has a diplomatic mission in erbil, and turkish airlines, the country's national flag carrier, flies direct from erbil not only to istanbul but also to antalya, carrying kurdish vacationers to the turkish riviera. and trade between turkey and the iraqi kurds has boomed to such an extent that if iraqi kurdistan were an independent country today, turkey would be its largest trading partner.
so far, so good. but what if there were two kurdistans, with a second to emerge in syria after al-assad's potential fall? could turkey deal with the second one with the same ease it has learned to deal with the first?
maybe, if the syrian kurds also denied the pkk safe haven. one could then envision commercial ties cementing the relationship between turkey and the syrian kurdistan, similar to turkey and the iraqi kurdistan.
this could be a tall order, though. while the pkk has had negligible support among the iraqi kurds, this has not been the case among the syrian kurds. granted, the syrian kurdish umbrella group, the kurdistan national council, has excluded the pkk from its membership. but still, some intelligence analysts suggest that the pkk has grassroots appeal inside syria.
then there is the syrian regime's complicity on the pkk issue. damascus harbored the pkk for years, only stopping in the past decade to improve relations with turkey. since the beginning of the syrian uprising, however, al-assad has once again allowed the pkk to have an armed presence inside syria in retaliation for turkey's support to the syrian uprising.
the prospect of a second kurdistan, one with a menacing pkk presence in it, now looms on turkey's radar screen. the al-assad regime has caught on to that fear, allowing the pkk ample room to operate inside syria, speaking to that primal turkish strategic anxiety and sending a message to ankara: "help my opposition, and you might as well help the pkk and build a second kurdistan in your backyard."
soner cagaptay is director of the turkish research program at the washington institute.