barry rubin

• johns hopkins üniversitesi, siyasal bilimler okulu, school of advanced international studies'e (sais) bağlı dış politika enstitüsü öğretim görevlisi.
  
  washington institute for near east policy adlı siyasi üretim kurumunda da kıdemli araştırma görevlisidir.
  
  türkiye ve ortadoğu ile ilgili bilimsel ve öykü niteliğinde çeşitli eserleri mevcuttur.
• israil sağı'nın da en sağında yer alan ve haftada bir broşür çıkarıp bakın ben kitap yazdım diyen akademisyen müsveddesi. köşe yazıları jerusalem post'dan takip edilebilir. fatih üniversitesi'nden bazı akademisyenler bu adamın başında bulunduğu merkezle işbirliğine gitmişlerdi hiç utanmadan.
• (bkz: turkish studies)
• terorizm üzerine, kendi öznel^* yorumlarını doldurduğu bir makalede "...fakat eğer insanlar böyle bir hareketin üyesi olmakla yetinebiliyorlarsa, bu aynı zamanda politik islamcılığın kendisinin, islam'ın geleneksel olarak olduğu gibi, kitleler için afyon olduğu, sadece belli ihtiyaçları karşılayarak insanları gerçek ve bütünsel devrimden alıkoyduğu anlamına da gelebilir." diyerek, ne kadar yanlı olabildiğine, ne kadar dinin politikleşmesine değinmeden suya sabuna dokunmadan oryantalizme yegane örnek olmuştur gece gece.^**
• radikal'in yorum sayfasinin kalitesini makalesi yayinlandigi gunler tek basina %80 dusuren bir amcamizdir bu. kendin bu kadar azili sagci ol, sonra da butun kotuleyici sifatlarin onune islam'i koy yerli yersiz. bu ne bicim is barry, bak...
  ... sana o doktorayi veren okulu operim.
• blogunda zaman zaman türkiye ile alakalı ilginç şeyler de yazıp çiziyor.
  
  http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/
  
  ayrıca (bkz: michael rubin).
• bir olay nasıl çarpıtılır, nasıl devlet ideolojisinin maşası olunurun, kendi ırkının nasıl bağnaz bir fanatiği olunurun en açık örneği, hamas'ı tanımlamak için kullandığı ifadeler bir tarafa, yazdığı şu yazı bir çok şeyi ifşa ediyor. bir de bu adam turkish studies çıkarıyor. ulan senin yaptığın dergi de ahlakın a'sı olur mu?
  
  "sympathy for the devil and the gaza sea confrontation: how can helping a repressive fascist genocide-intending hamas regime be noble?"
  
  http://www.gloria-center.org/…ympathy-for-the-devil
• gazze krizi sonrası türk dostlarına bir mektup yayınlamış blog sitesinden.
  
  an open letter to turkish friends [in turkish and english]
  by barry rubin
  
  the turkish text is followed by an english translation
  
  kıymetli dostlar,
  
  israil’de, bizler, hayatlarını kaybeden türkler için son derece üzgünüz. bu çatışmayı istemedik. tamamıyla haklı olduğumuzu, herşeyi doğru olarak yaptığımızı ve hata yapmadığımızı iddia etmiyor, ancak, dostluk ruhu içerisinde bu konuların tartışılabildiğini ve en iyi şekilde çözülebildiğini ifade etmek istiyoruz. aynı zamanda türkiye’deki deprem dönemindem beri gelişen karşılıklı işbirliğimizi ve ortak anlayışımızı da hatırlıyoruz.
  
  israil her ne hatalar yapmış ise dahi, türkler ve yahudiler arasında osmanlı’dan gelen kardeşlik geleneği, ve türkiye ile israil arasında gelişen dostluk bu zor zamanları aşmamıza yardımcı olacaktır. lütfen hatırlayınız ki, yahudi aleyhtarı ve israil aleyhtarı duyguları sömürme yöntemi, gücü elinde tutmak isteyen, kendi teb’asını sömüren ve kandıran tiranlar tarafından öteden beri kullanılmıştır.
  
  bugün akp icinde bulunan dar görüşlü siyasetciler, türkiye’nin demokratik anayasasını tahrip etmek ve bir sonraki seçimleri kazanmak için gereksiz çatışmalar yaratmakta ve bunu kullanmaktadırlar. türban ve imam hatip okullari konularında, gelenekleri degiştirme çalışmalarını ,türk halkı kabullenmedi. kürt açılımı hezimete uğradı. yolsuzluk skandalları halkın kızgınlığına yol açti. anayasa mahkemesi bazı kanun tekliflerini red etti.akp,yedi yıllık iktidar sonrasında halen ülkenin kontrolunü elinde tutabilecek bir yol aramaya çalışıyor.
  
  çoğunuzun bildiği gibi, türk halkının son olaylara karşı tepkisi aynı yönde olduğu halde; erdoğan rejiminin mevcut politikası , türkiye anayasasını değiştirmek ve yargıda kontrolü ele geçirmek için; inancı ve dini kendi siyasi emellerine alet etmeyi ve toplumsal ve uluslararası nefreti yükseltmeyi istemektedir. geçmiş yıllarda daha ılımlı olduğu halde ,erdoğan rejimi şimdi , ülke ekonomisini başarısız yönettiği ve akp oylarının düşüş gösterdiği bir dönemde, gelecek senenin seçimlerini kazanmak amacıyla, nefret ve toplumsal histeriyi istismar etmeyi istemektedir. bazı tanınmış türk islam din adamları dahi bu hareket tarzını eleştirmektedir.
  
  atatürk’ün “binbir türlü siyasî ve şahsî maksat ve menfaat temini için, dini alet ve vasıta olarak kullananların mevcudiyeti” ile ilgili sözlerini hatırlayınız.
  
  ve diğerlerini:
  
  “din gerekli bir kurumdur, dinsiz milletlerin devamına imkân yoktur. yalnız şurası var ki; din, allah ile kul arasındaki bağlılıktır. birinci prensip budur. ikinci prensip; biz din işlerini, millet ve devlet işleriyle karıştırmamaya çalışıyor, amaca ve eyleme dayanan bağnaz hareketlerden sakınıyoruz ve buna asla meydan vermeyeceğiz.”
  
  türkiye’de önceki hükümetlerin, israil’i eleştirdiklerini—belki de hakkı ile—ve sonrasında türk halkının memnuniyeti doğrultusunda sakince çalışarak sorunların çözümünü sağlamış olduklarını düşünmekten kendimizi alıkoyamıyoruz. bu çalışma yolu, iki ülke arasındaki sorunların çözümünde uzun yıllar başarı ile uygulanmış idi. bu tehdit ve aşağılamalara gerek kalmaksızın; iki taraf, özür dileme ve tazminat ödeme konuları üzerinde çalışabilirlerdi.
  
  tarihi boyunca,türkiye cumhuriyeti'nin esas aldığı ilke “yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh” idi. bu ideal, türk cumhuriyeti’nin kendi sınırları dışında da çatışmalardan uzak durmasını hedefleyen ve yakın zamana kadar başarıyla sürdürülen temel bir stratejiyi işaret ediyordu. burada soru, bir kısım türk vatandaşlarının ablukayı kırmak şeklindeki uluslararası bir tartışma konusu üzerinde aldıkları bireysel kararlarının, tüm türk halkının kendisine saldırılmış ve aşağılanmış gibi algılanmasına yol açıp açmadığıdır.
  
  bir kısım türk vatandaşı, tamamen bireysel olarak hareket edip, yabancı askerlere saldırabilir veya şiddetin doğduğu bir ortam yaratabilir, ama bunun tüm ülkeyi peşinden sürüklemesi gerekir mi?
  
  bir kısım türk vatandaşı bir yabancı terör grubunu destekleyip akabinde milletini bir uluslararası çatışma ile karşı karşıya getirme lüksüne sahip midir?
  
  bireylerin hareketlerinın milletleri ve devletleri bağlamasına izin veren bu yaklaşımı benimsediğiniz zaman ortaya çıkan problem, tüm dünyada türk milletinin barıştan uzak ve yabancı çatışmalara bulaşmış bir imaja kavuşmasına önayak olabiliyor.
  
  bu tür bir ortam atatürk’ün sulh’u işaret eder iken, uyardığı bir durum değil mi?
  
  ümidimiz, dostluğumuzun bu trajik olaylara rağmen yaşamasını sürmesidir.
  
  an open letter to turkish friends
  
  by barry rubin
  
  dear friends:
  
  we in israel very much regret the loss of life that has taken place. we did not seek this confrontation and we are not saying that we are completely right, have handled everything correctly, or have not made mistakes. but in a spirit of friendship these issues can be discussed and worked out in the best manner. we also remember the time of the earthquake in turkey and the spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding that prevailed then.
  
  at the same time, though, whatever mistakes israel has made, we ask at this difficult moment in the long history of friendship between the turkish and the jewish peoples beginning in ottoman times and the more recent friendship between the turkish and israeli peoples: please remember that stirring up anti-jewish and anti-israel hysteria has long been used by tyrants to seize power, to fool and exploit their people.
  
  today, narrow-minded politicians within the akp are exploiting and creating unnecessary conflicts in order to destroy turkey's democratic constitution and win the next election. the turkish people have already rejected its efforts to change turkish tradition regarding head-scarves and the imam hotep schools. its kurdish policy has collapsed in failure. corruption scandals have angered the public. the constitutional court has already rejected some of its actions and may do so for more of them. after seven years in power it is trying to figure out a way to stay in control on the country.
  
  many of you know that even while the turkish people are united in their response to the recent events, the current policy of the erdogan regime wants to exploit faith and promote hatred order to change the turkish constitution to gain control over the court system. the erdogan regime now wants to exploit hatred and hysteria to win next year's election at the moment when it has mismanaged the economy and is declining in the public opinion polls. even some well-known turkish islamic clerics have criticized this behavior.
  
  remember the words of kemal ataturk: he who exploits faith for personal and political gain is contemptible.
  
  ”religion is an important institution. a nation without religion cannot survive. yet it is also very important to note that religion is a link between god and the individual believer. the brokerage of the pious cannot be permitted. those who use religion for their own benefit are detestable. we are against such a situation and will not allow it. those who use religion in such a manner have fooled our people; it is against just such people that we have fought and will continue to fight.”
  
  one cannot help but think that previous governments in turkey would have criticized israel—perhaps correctly—and then worked calmly to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of the turkish nation. this has been the way that issues between the two countries have been worked out for many years successfully. the two sides would have been able to work out the questions of whether an apology should be made or compensation paid without the need for threats or insults.
  
  for its entire history, the turkish republic’s foreign policy has been based on the idea, "peace at home, peace abroad." this expresses his fundamental strategy that was brilliantly successful: that the turkish republic would avoid looking for conflicts outside its own territory.
  
  the question here, asked with all respect, is whether the decision of a few turkish citizens as individuals to try to break a blockade imposed as part of a foreign conflict requires the entire country to perceive itself being attacked and insulted.
  
  can any turkish citizen, acting purely on his own, attack foreign soldiers, or help create a situation where violence takes place, and then drag the entire country into a crisis or a foreign conflict by getting themselves killed or injured? can a turkish citizen support a foreign terrorist group—despite the fact that erdogan denies this, hamas has staged hundreds of terrorist attacks designed to kill israeli civilians--and then force the nation to back that group by helping to set off a confrontation?
  
  the problem is that by taking this approach you are allowing these individuals to take any actions they want, which can lead to the image of the entire turkish nation worldwide becoming one not associated with peacefulness and entangling turkey with foreign conflicts. is this not the kind of thing that ataturk was warning against?
  
  we hope that our friendship will survive these tragic events.
  sincerely, barry rubin
  
  kaynak: http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/…kish-friends.html
• why israel shouldn't attack iranian nuclear installations--unless it has to do so
  by barry rubin
  
  an israeli attack on iranian nuclear installations for the purpose of trying to stop iran from obtaining nuclear weapons at all would be a mistake. instead, israel should plan--and indeed is planning--for a multi-layer campaign of airstrikes, missile defenses, and other measures in the event of iran ever posing a specific threat of attacking israel.
  
  before going into the details of why i'm saying this, however, let me stress that this is not something likely to be a central issue in the near-term future. that is precisely why we should discuss it now.
  
  let me also emphasize that israeli plans should be in place such that if there ever would be an imminent threat of an iranian attack, it should be preempted. what should be avoided, however, is an israeli attack based merely on the goal of stopping iran from obtaining nuclear weapons at all. it is far better to risk setting of a major regional war only if there is a need to do so, as happened, for example, regarding the 1967 war, a preemptive attack required for self-defense.
  
  of course, iran's having nuclear weapons is an overall danger for israeli interests, wider regional stability, and u.s. interests. such a situation would in theory open israel daily to the possibility of an iranian nuclear attack. yet history shows that israelis would adjust to this situation, if remote as it would likely be, without panic or paralysis. given a calm analysis, however, and the alternatives, a preemptive attack on iran possessing a few nuclear weapons and long-range missiles would make matters worse, not better.
  
  here's why:
  
  1. iran is unlikely to attack israel with nuclear weapons but if israel attacks iranian nuclear facilities such an outcome becomes inevitable. a state of open war would exist and the tehran regime would be seeking revenge. all other options--containment, deterrence, a longer-run overthrow of the regime by domestic forces, a u.s.-iran war based on accident or misperception--would be closed.
  
  moreover, by waiting to see how the situation develops, israel will still, in the event of an apparent war crisis or a serious belief that iran is going to attack, can always preempt in the future. the problem with the idea of attacking to prevent iran from getting nuclear weapons is that it is based on the opposite view--a questionable assumption that an iranian attack is inevitable in the near future.
  
  let me again emphasize that if israel ever concludes on the basis of intelligence and actions by iran that there is a real or imminent threat, it should react militarily.
  
  it would be a mistake to base a belief that iran is not going to attack israel completely on the idea that tehran's restraint or interests would prohibit such an outcome. we know the statements of iranian leaders, their goals, and their ideology. perhaps even more important, we know about the existence of factions within the regime that are very risk-oriented and the existence of even more extreme elements in the islamic revolutionary guard corps (irgc).
  
  yet also to be taken into account are three additional points: limited iranian capabilities; other iranian goals, as aggressive as they must be; plus tehran’s fear of retaliation from israel and the united states. it is the combination of these four factors that are persuasive.
  
  limited capabilities: for a very long period of time, iran will only be able to launch a very small number of missiles against israel simultaneously. therefore, israel and the united states could more easily counter such a threat, including by attacks against the launchers. in addition, over time an israeli missile defense system and a parallel system for stopping rocket attacks (that would come from hamas and hizballah in response to any israeli attack on iran) would improve dramatically.
  
  given the small number of missiles fired by iran at the same time, plus the u.s. and israeli anti-missile systems, iran's leadership would know that it could not knock out israeli airfields. thus, any attack on israel would trigger massive destruction of iran. and of course some of the missiles could easily miss israel entirely (or be knocked down) so they would explode in lebanon, jordan, and the west bank. add to this the fact of u.s. warning systems, anti-missile defenses, and retaliation and the deck is highly stacked against tehran.
  
  the point here is not that the tehran regime would be deterred by purely humanitarian considerations nor proceed in a calm and deliberate matter. but the level of "craziness" would have to be distinctly higher to start a war under these conditions.
  
  in addition, a specific threat of any systematic iranian attack would also have a warning period allowing israeli leaders to decide to make retaliation possible on a specific occasion. and knowing that israel would have plenty of capability for a second strike that would inflict huge damage on iran, even if the iranian attack enjoyed some success, would also be a deterrent on iran.
  
  moreover, iran is unlikely to launch a nuclear attack on israel (and certainly not an immediate attack on obtaining nuclear weapons) is because that would interfere with tehran’s overall strategy. that is to use the nuclear umbrella to carry out a long-term, low-risk aggressive policy of supporting surrogates to destabilize or take over other countries, along with enjoying the fruits of intimidation and the resulting appeasement from europe and arabic-speaking countries that a nuclear iran is likely to enjoy.
  
  once iran goes nuclear its prestige in the muslim-majority world among the masses is likely to rise sky-high. the strength of revolutionary islamist movements, especially those allied to iran, is going to increase. arabic-speaking states know that they cannot rely completely on u.s. guarantees particularly at a time when a u.s. government proclaims that country’s weakness. on a whole range of issues, iran is going to make big gains.
  
  having nuclear weapons and having the west and arabic-speaking world both deterred and pushed toward appeasement by fear of iran's nuclear weapons is an advantageous situation for tehran, which could subvert other countries and expand spheres of influence without fear of retaliation. by firing the weapons, those advantages would be lost.
  
  2. no matter how it is conducted or even how much initial success it has, an israeli attack is not going to do away with iran’s possession of nuclear weapons. it does not make sense to follow a strategy you know in advance will not work: to attack iran to stop it from obtaining nuclear weapons when that effort will, at best, merely postpone tehran getting them. at that point, following an israeli attac and an iranian crash program to rebuild facilities and get weapons, a nuclear war is a virtual certainty.
  
  it is vital to understand that an israeli attack will increase the likelihood of iran firing nuclear weapons on iran, after a period of time.
  
  as one expert aptly put it:
  
  "you can bomb an enrichment facility, but you can’t bomb an enrichment program. (or not one as well-developed as iran’s.) it’s not like a reactor, with billions of dollars’ worth of hard-to-replace capital piled up in one spot over the course of several years. instead, it’s thousands of interchangeable pieces that can be brought together and operated more or less anywhere."
  
  and so, iran would be able to rebuild after any such attack and, even if it took a few years, would be far more aggressive against israel than it has been in practice up to that point. there is widespread agreement on this point including within israeli military and political circles.
  
  in addition, too much could go wrong with an israeli attack, which could fail in part or whole if bombs miss the target, too many planes were lost, etc. again, even a best-case outcome would not end the problem. it would, in fact, guarantee a large-scale future confrontation. and a partly failed raid would result in such a nuclear war happening immediately.
  
  3. while the direct costs after such an operation are sustainable for israel, they are likely to be high. if israel faced an imminent threat from iran, it would be worthwhile to bear such costs. in other words, if an attack were necessary to stop a specific plan or high level of likelihood that iran would attack israel with nuclear weapons, any cost would be worthwhile. but just to stop iran from having nuclear weapons and long-range missiles in general does not validate such high costs.
  
  the potential regional and international outcomes from an israeli attack would include:
  
  --rocket attacks by hamas and hizballah along with border fighting.
  
  --increased iranian attempts to sponsor terrorist attacks against israel throughout the world.
  
  --possible attempted retaliation by iran using unconventional weapons.
  
  --a potential wider war between iran and the west which would create serious western resentment against israel.
  
  --western criticism of israel and perhaps serious problems in u.s.-israel relations, especially with the obama administration in power.
  
  while many arab regimes would be happy at a successful israeli strike, this would not bring any material benefits for israel. the same would be true for western satisfaction that israel “took care of the problem.”
  
  indeed, while an unsuccessful israeli raid would be harshly criticized and might lead to sanctions on iran, a successful israeli raid would produce the reaction that since the danger would now be gone israel could afford to make major concessions to the palestinians and syria.
  
  again, if israel really faced the specific threat of an iranian nuclear attack, such costs would be worthwhile, even limited in comparison to the problem. yet why should israel pay a high cost for the mere possibility that at some future time tehran would go to war with israel using nuclear weapons?
  
  it should be stressed, too, that any attack on iranian nuclear facilities would also not resolve the threat—no matter how high or low one assessed it to be—of iran giving nuclear materials to terrorists. while this is a serious problem (and one often underestimated in the west), a military attack on iran would actually increase the likelihood of this happening, since iran would have radioactive materials but not perhaps the capability of delivering them by missile plus a thirst for revenge. letting terrorists deliver the nuclear devices is an ideal solution for tehran and would be perceived there as both lower-risk and higher-priority than it would be otherwise.
  
  4. finally, there is a rather ironic geostrategic aspect of this issue. if we are discussing certainties rather than scenarios, iran’s main threat in practice is not to israel but to arabic-speaking states and to u.s. interests.
  
  israel can defend itself; the arab regimes cannot. arab states are going to be intimidated and subverted internally by iran; israel will not engage in appeasement or face any significant increase in direct subversion or a conventional threat on its borders.
  
  on the contrary, fear and preoccupation with iran's threat will force arab states to devote more attention and resources on that front. (the one exception is that iran's ally, syria, is likely to be bolder in fomenting attacks on israel from hamas and hizballah smug in the knowledge that tehran will protect it and that the united states won't put pressure on it.)
  
  why, then, should israel engage in a high-risk, costly venture to protect countries like saudi arabia or iraq that will do nothing to reciprocate or to reduce their own hostility to israel?
  
  rather, it is the job of the united states to provide a regional umbrella against an iranian nuclear threat. america must set up a defensive shield for its arab state clients, which will also necessarily include israel, provide them with assurances, and threaten iran. in practice, this also means that the united states will have to support israel's missile defense efforts and provide help in obtaining other military equipment israel will need.
  
  if washington fails to handle containment properly, there will be a long period of testing in which it will have an opportunity to see the extent of the threat from iran and its allies, notably syria. this will lead either to a better u.s. policy on the issue or to israel being able to readjust its strategy toward iran as required.
  
  during that period, israel will always have the option to act if it perceives a direct and immediate threat to itself. thus, it will not in any way be dependent on u.s. protection although it will also benefit from whatever is provided by washington to defend arab states or the region in general from an iranian attack. equally, if iran is perceived as more aggressive, international support for israeli action would be far higher than at the beginning of the iran nuclear era.
  
  it is not impossible that at some point iran itself will provoke a war with the united states due to its subversive and terrorist efforts in arabic-speaking countries; its interference with u.s. operations and shipping in the persian gulf; direct attacks by its surrogates on u.s. forces in iraq, afghanistan, or elsewhere; or its brinkmanship with nuclear weapons.
  
  of course, it is more likely that this will not happen, but if iran does behave in this manner the world will blame it--and many countries will coalesce against it--in any resulting war. why should israel take on iran all by itself, not only lacking international support but actually receiving international condemnation for doing so?
  
  it would be a mistake, and one israeli decisionmakers aren’t going to make, to assume that iran will immediately use nuclear weapons against israel or that israel can easily make the problem go away with a series of air attacks. whatever public posture israel’s government uses about a possible military option—and one can certainly argue it is in israeli, u.s., western, and arab interests for tehran to perceive a real israeli threat—actually to carry out such an attack would be a mistake.
  
  kaynak: http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/…ts (rubinreports)
• kuzey ırak'a giden israilli akademisyen dr. jonathan spyer ile bir röportaj yapmış akademisyen. röportajdan israil'in son dönemde kürtlere iyice yanaştığı ve kürdistan'ın kurulmasına bir adım kaldığı anlaşılabiliyor. filistin fethine çıkmadan önce bunu da düşünmek gerek.
  
  http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/…-dr-jonathan.html