soner çağaptay

• newsweek'te yazdığı turkey's turning point isimli makalede, "gulenists prosecutors are arresting secular prosecutors" tabirini kullanarak, geçen hafta aydınlık dergisi'nin yayınladığı bir makaleye gönderme yapmış -sanırım- araştırmacı. beni geren kısmı, savcıların gülenci olup olmadıkları değil de (o başka bir tartışmanın konusu çünkü), ortada dayandırılacak adam akıllı bir belge ya da bilgi olmadan böyle "hakaret eder gibi" o savcılara "gülenci!" diyebilmenin, newsweek'te de mümkün olabilmesidir. insanın washington institute'da çalışıyor olması, ona bu hakkı veriyorsa -ki veriyor anlaşılan- o halde mao çok yerinde söylemiş: "siyaset kansız savaştır."
• daha önce adını duymadığım, hakkında bu kadar entry görünce şaşırdığım, az önce newsweek'in (march 8) sayısında çıkan yazısını okumak suretiyle kendisiyle tanışmaktan memnun olduğum analist. newsweek gibi bir dergide yazıp, üstüne üstlük abd'de bir think-thank de çalışıp, gülen hareketinin gerçek yüzünü ve türkiye'de akp tarafından oluşturulmakta olan sivil faşizmin ayak seslerini bu kadar cesurca ve yalınkat bir şekilde tahlil etmesi kendini izlenmeye değer biri kılmaya yetiyor.
  
  türkiye'yi, gülen cemaati tarafından türlü çeşitli yollarla beslenen sözde liberal, 2. cumhuriyetçi angutlardan dinleye dinleye akp'yi demokrasi havarisi sanan batılı aydınların bu adamı da okuması ihtimali bile değerli.
  
  nihayet abd sahnesinde, türkiye'den farklı bir ses.
• asagidaki yazinin yazari:
  
  behind turkey’s witch hunt
  the ergenekon case exposes the power of a shadowy islamic brotherhood that controls the turkish police.
  by soner cagaptay | newsweek
  
  published may 16, 2009
  
  from the magazine issue dated may 25, 2009
  
  in which country does a liberal woman who educates poor girls worry about her safety when she goes home at night? pakistan, afghanistan—right—but also add turkey now. in an early-morning raid on april 13, turkish police arrested more than a dozen middle-aged liberal women working for the society for contemporary life (cydd), a nongovernmental organization that provides educational scholarships to poor teenage girls. the arrests were part of the ergenekon court case, in which police have arrested hundreds of people, including army officers, opponents of the justice and development party (akp) government, renowned journalists, artists and now these women, charging them with plotting to overthrow the government.
  
  when the case opened in 2007, akp watchers saw it as an opportunity for turkey to clean up corruption, such as security officials' involvement in the criminal underworld. but the case is much more than that. it is a tool for the akp to curb freedoms, and more than anything else illustrates the power of the gülen tarikat (islamic order) that now controls the turkish police and, you guessed it, educational scholarships for the poor.
  
  the gulen tarikat emerged in turkey in the 1970s under the charismatic leadership of fethullah gülen, a respected imam. while tarikats serve as brotherhoods of solidarity much like orders in the roman catholic church, the gülen tarikat suggests blending conservative muslim values with a modern lifestyle. most turks have a sinister view of the spiritual message of this tarikat that i do not share. thanks to missionary and volunteer work, the gülen tarikat obtained social and political power globally over the decades. it has business lobbying groups and think tanks in washington and brussels, owns universities, banks, tv networks and newspapers around the world, and operates schools in which more than 2 million students receive education, many with full scholarships.
  
  the tarikat gained political power in turkey in the 1990s through its support of various political parties. in return, it gained appointments to key positions in the police and education ministry. its growing power was checked in 1997 when the turkish military issued a declaration against the then-ruling islamist welfare party (rp) warning that its policies violated turkey's secular constitution. ensuing demonstrations and a media campaign brought down that government. soon after, the turkish courts filed a case against gülen, alleging he was trying to take over turkey by asking his followers to "move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers." gülen left turkey, settling in the united states.
  
  when the akp, established out of the rp's ashes, came to power in 2002, the gülen tarikat experienced a revival. it supported the akp; in return, its members received government contracts and took charge of the police and its domestic intelligence arm. the recent arrests demonstrate the power of the gülen tarikat: the police wiretapped liberal women, and only later asked the prosecutor to arrest them. they were questioned for days, and released without charges. their police files, testimonies and details from their private lives were leaked to gülen tarikat–owned media. these media described the women as members of a terrorist group and cast the cydd's president, türkan saylan, in a negative light for having been born to a mother of christian-swiss origins—a bothersome spin given that the gülen tarikat's rhetoric promotes interfaith dialogue.
  
  saylan, a 74-year-old cancer patient undergoing chemotherapy, was questioned and many cydd members have since been released, but the damage to their reputations and their work in secular education is done. the case has become a show trial, helping the akp and the gülen tarikat pressure the liberals and tarnish their reputations. on april 26, turkey's justice minister said that police intelligence listens to the private conversations of 70,000 people; almost one in every 1,000 turks lives under police scrutiny today. in the united states, that ratio is one in 137,000.
  
  the ergenekon case has become a witch hunt. if you have doubts, call a friend in turkey and ask for an opinion of the case. your friend will respond with details of the weather. the last time people were afraid to discuss a public court case in the west was during the mccarthy trials in the u.s. though it is in accession talks with the european union, turkey is devolving into a similar state of fear. sad as it is, there is a way out of this conundrum if the akp turns ergenekon into a case that targets only criminals, and the gülen tarikat lets go of its control over the turkish police and truly becomes a spiritual movement.
  
  cagaptay, a senior fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, is the author of islam secularism and nationalism in modern turkey: who is a turk? (2006).
  
  http://www.newsweek.com/id/197896
• türkiye'yi bir korku cumhuriyeti'ne benzetmiş son yazısında.
  
  http://online.wsj.com/…87204575101820058883004.html
• foreign policy'de yazdığı makalenin online haline dergi tarafından bir correction eklenmiş yazar. aynen alalım;
  
  "correction: the original version of this article stated that an audio recording of turkey's chief of staff "was leaked to" the newspaper vakit. it was, in fact, uploaded to the internet, and vakit was one of the first publications to publish it.
  the article also stated that a turkish court charged mr. gulen with corruption and anti-secular political activities. in fact, he was not charged with corruption, only with attempting to undermine the secular regime. finally, the article also stated that the welfare party "was supported by the fhg"; the relationship between mr. gulen and prime minister erbakan, the leader of the welfare party, is in reality more fraught. the two have historically represented separate parts of the islamic currents within turkey."
  
  1) yazıda belirtildiği gibi ses kaydı vakit'e sızdırılmadı, internete verildi vakit oradan aldı.
  2) yazıda belirtildiği gibi türk yargısı gülen'i yolsuzlukla suçlamadı, sadece rejimi değiştirmeye çalışmakla suçladı.
  3) yazıda belirtildiği gibi refah partisi ile gülen hareketi arasında bir bağlantı yok aksine çok farklı perspektiflere sahiptirler.
  
  iki sayafalık yazıda bu kadar bilgi hatası varsa, problem soner çağaptayda değil, kendisini soner çağaptayın kullanmasına olanak sağlayan foreign policydedir.
• is turkey still a western ally?
  the akp's foreign policy is driven by two new factors: islam and money.
  by soner cagaptay | from today's wall street journal europe
  
  i spent part of 2008 in turkey to figure out whether ankara could still be considered a western ally. that it's necessary to raise this question at all is an indication of how far the governing justice and development party (akp) has isolated the country from its traditional partners.
  
  for years turkish foreign policy was driven by shared western values, including democracy, membership to institutions like nato and a sense of common destiny with europe and the u.s. since the akp assumed power in 2002, turkish foreign policy is increasingly driven by two new factors: religion and money.
  
  over the past year, the neo-islamist akp government has hosted a series of anti-western leaders, including the presidents of iran and sudan, with whom ankara seeks closer relations. at the same time, turkey has ratcheted up its verbal attacks on its traditional western allies, especially israel. while the akp seems to mirror western policies toward such countries as sudan, iran or russia, it fosters intimate ties with these governments.
  
  last july in istanbul, for example, i witnessed turkish joy over the capture of serb leader radovan karadzic, the "butcher of bosnia" who was indicted for genocide at the hague tribunal. just days later, however, the akp welcomed omar al-bashir, the even bigger butcher of darfur. ironically, the visit of the sudanese president to turkey coincided with the hague court's prosecutor request that mr. al-bashir be arrested for committing genocide in darfur.
  
  yet president al-bashir received a warm welcome in turkey, where he alleged that his government "had restored peace to darfur," and defended the implementation of shariah law in resolving the darfur conflict. the akp, the governing party of a secular state, did not challenge these statements. instead, it chose to discuss oil investments in sudan.
  
  later on in august, the akp welcomed iran's president to istanbul. turkey officially stands against iran's nuclear project. but the akp embraced mahmoud ahmadinejad, shutting down istanbul's busy beltway for his travel comfort. in another favor to mr. ahmadinejad, the akp departed from the tradition of having visiting muslim heads of state pray in the isolated dolmabahce mosque which has served as istanbul's protocol mosque. instead, the government allowed him to pray in the central blue mosque with thousands of other worshippers, whereupon he put on an anti-american and anti-israeli show which i had the displeasure of witnessing after attending friday prayers there.
  
  the iranian leader left istanbul happy, with a security cooperation treaty under one arm and a draft treaty for turkish investments in iranian gas fields under the other -- the latter in violation of western financial sanctions against tehran. turkish media reported that u.s. pressure prevented the investment treaty from being finalized. nevertheless, in november turkey's energy minister visited tehran for further discussions on energy deals.
  
  the akp empathizes with the islamist regime in sudan -- which it sees as a victim of the west -- and with the mullahs in iran because it sees turkey in religious communion with these states. in march 2006, prime minister recep tayyip erdogan addressed an arab league summit in khartoum, saying, "the west is using terrorism to sell us weapons." it appears that mr. erdogan has finally answered the question of where turkey belongs -- and that in his opinion, it's not with the west. on iran, mr. erdogan told a washington crowd on nov. 14 that the akp's policy is that "countries that oppose iran's nuclear weapons should themselves not have nuclear weapons."
  
  at the same time, the iranians know how to exploit turkey's security concerns. ankara is upset about insufficient u.s. and european assistance against the terror infrastructure of the kurdistan workers party (pkk) in northern iraq and western europe, respectively. tehran courts turkish hearts and minds by bombing pkk camps in iraq and by providing turkey with intelligence support against the pkk. financial instincts cement this religious sympathy. as polls show that turks increasingly value iran's friendship, energy and other cooperation projects with iran will go down well in turkey.
  
  energy politics also bring ankara closer to moscow. only days after the u.s. condemned russia's invasion of georgia, calling for moscow's isolation, the akp invited russian foreign minister sergei lavrov to ankara for consultations.
  
  in 2002, russia was turkey's sixth-biggest trading partner. bilateral commerce has skyrocketed since then, turning russia into turkey's top trading partner in the first half of 2008. accordingly, few turks question the close ties with moscow, and realists point out that turkey depends on russia for two-thirds of its gas.
  
  last but not least, israel has become mr. erdogan's sandbag while hamas sits in his heart. turkey has long had warm ties to the jewish state, since turks did not wear ideology or religion on their sleeves in their relationship with israel. but under the akp, those relations are getting frostier. the conflict in gaza has given the akp an excuse to bring turkish-israeli relations to their lowest level in decades. shortly after jerusalem launched its offensive, mr. erdogan started a disingenuous initiative to "end the war in gaza," traveling to saudi arabia, jordan, syria and egypt -- but not to israel.
  
  mr. erdogan's rhetoric, meanwhile, has reached islamist fever pitch. earlier this month he suggested that "allah would punish israel" for attacking hamas, and that jerusalem's actions would lead to its own "destruction." on jan. 16, he questioned whether the jewish state should still be allowed in the u.n. while accusing israel of deliberately attacking civilians, mr. erdogan claimed that "hamas's rockets are not causing any casualties in israel."
  
  his attacks worked. after mr. erdogan bashed israel almost daily on national tv since the beginning of the operations in gaza, 200,000 turks showed up on jan. 4 in the freezing rain in istanbul, calling for the "death" of the jewish state. pro-akp papers, meanwhile, question turkey's military cooperation with israel.
  
  now, turkey's tiny and well-integrated jewish community feels physically threatened for the first time since 1492, when it found safe haven in the ottoman empire after fleeing the spanish inquisition. there have been threats of violence against jews and, even more shocking, banners have been plastered on jewish-owned businesses, asking people to boycott them.
  
  u.s. president-elect barack obama and the european union face a challenge in turkey. the country's messy foreign policy is a harbinger of things to come. under the akp, turkey will increasingly side with its radical, anti-western neighbors, even if it remains committed, at least verbally, to the west. i hate to say it, but this is not your mother's turkey.
  
  mr. cagaptay, a senior fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, is the author of "islam, secularism and nationalism in modern turkey: who is a turk?" (routledge, 2006).
  
  kaynak: http://online.wsj.com/…le/sb123266156689407459.html
• the scary european model
  
  it’s not modern, liberal, or western.
  
  there has been speculation about where turkey is heading ever since the islamist justice and development party (akp) came to power in 2002. the early years suggested to most observers that turkey was heading west, as the akp lobbied hard for membership in the european union, and pushed the liberal-democratic and free-market reforms that membership requires. lately, the consensus view has shifted 180 degrees. as europe makes clear its resistance to welcoming a muslim-majority member, turkey seems to be positioning itself as a regional power broker among its islamist neighbors, most dramatically by casting a no vote against u.n. sanctions on iran.
  
  our view is a bit different: turkey is heading toward a european model, but it is neither modern nor liberal. it is the east european model of the 1940s, when communist parties took power in democratic elections, only to subvert democracy and veil their nations behind the iron curtain. after the czechoslovak communist party won the 1946 elections, it quickly undermined one of eastern europe’s most progressive democracies. by 1948 the communists had quieted all opposition by various means, including the infamous defenstration of a top moderate politician in prague. within two years czechoslovakia had joined the communist bloc. the rise of an illiberal party that would radically change its country’s foreign policy would foreshadow akp’s conduct decades later. this is not to equate communism with islamism; rather, both movements, rooted in an illiberal ideology, see democracy as a means to an end and espouse a manichaean, us vs. them mentality.
  
  there were early signs in the akp’s visceral anti-american rhetoric and its banishment of women from top posts, as well as the arrests and firings of political rivals. these signs were mostly ignored because, at the time, the akp also promoted eu accession and pragmatic ties with the united states, even while bashing the west. but during the eight years of akp rule, the party’s rhetoric has significantly shaped majority opinion. more than 90 percent of turks read and write only turkish, and rely on turkish media sources now either intimidated by or controlled outright by the akp. under the akp, wiretaps of political opponents have become so common that restaurants now offer to check cell phones so citizens can deposit their phones before sitting down for dinner, to prevent eavesdropping.
  
  the akp’s early anti-western rhetoric signaled hidden foreign-policy goals that are now coming to light. after weakening democratic checks and balances—by imposing tax fines on the media and wiretaps on opponents to stifle dissent—the akp feels comfortable enough to in power match its foreign policy to its rhetoric. it will continue to face away from the west, even if it ostensibly remains in nato. the akp will continue to defend islamist leaders—from sudan’s omar al-bashir to iran’s mahmoud ahmadinejad—against the demands of the international community. domestically, the akp will continue to trample on free media, gender equality, and democratic safeguards such as an independent judiciary.
  
  but hope remains. by the postwar czechoslovak political clock, the year in turkey is 1947. the authoritarian party does not yet have full control. turkey remains a multiparty democracy and, as of the last elections, only one third of voters supports the akp. while the secular republican people’s party previously had no answer to the grassroots organization of the akp or the anti-western populism of akp prime minister recep tayyip erdogan, it now has a real leader in kemal kiliçdaroglu, a charismatic social democrat. international pressure may yet block some akp ambitions, especially if the u.s. and others speak up. and thankfully, no soviet tanks wait in the wings to suppress the turkish people’s will.
  
  yet most liberal turks still refuse to recognize their own political failure. one still hears them suggest—absurdly—that european and american leaders placed the akp in power. to gain ground in the 2011 elections, non-islamists need to return to grassroots politics. in the meantime, the west must stand with democracy by ensuring free and fair elections and maintaining a level political playing field. either liberals unite now, or the clock moves to 1948.
  
  http://www.newsweek.com/…-scary-european-model.html
  
  türkçesi için:
  
  http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/…w.aspx?id=15471640
• 15 eylül 2010'da torn turkey, european turkey isimli makalesi yayınlanmış, "..therefore, once the akp finishes basking in its victory, it must envision a new turkey that is for everyone" demiş. seçilmiş vekilleri sorumluluğa ve göreve davet etmiş.
• majestelerine biat etmediği için otoriter ve anti-semitik delikanlıların hakaretlerine maruz kalan analist.
• valla ve sanırım, birine biat edip etmediği meselesi öncelikle majestesine bakar.