fumimaro konoe

• 12 ekim 1891 ile 16 aralık 1945 tarihleri arasında yaşamış siyaset adamı ve başbakan.
  
  ailesi imparator naipliği ve yüksek devlet görevlerini elinde tutan beş büyük japon ailesinin en güçlüsüydü. babası atsumaro da ünlü bir devlet adamıydı. tokyo imparatorluk üniversitesi'nde, ardından kyoto imparatorluk üniversitesi'nde ülkenin seçkin gençleriyle birlikte öğrenim gördü. japonya'nın i. dünya savaşı'na katıldığı dönemde hukuk fakültesini bitirdi. öğrencilik yıllarında batı felsefesi, edebiyatı ve sosyolojisinin yanı sıra batı'nın toplumsal ve ekonomik sorunlarını yakından öğrendi. konoe, bu dönemde oscar wilde'ın 1891'de yazdığı the soul of man under socialism (sosyalizmde insanın ruhu) adlı makalesini japoncaya çevirdi. makale bir dergi de yayımlandıysa da, hükümet kamu düzeni açısından tehlikeli olduğu gerekçesiyle derginin satışını yasakladı.
  
  parlamenter yönetimin açık savunucularından, saray soylusu ve yaşlı devlet adamı saionci kimmoçi'nin koruması altında siyasal yaşama giren konoe, paris barış konferansı'na (1919) katılan japon heyetinde yer aldı. bu sırada yazdığı bir makalede, geniş nüfuz alanları bulunan ülkelerin çıkarlarını korumaya yönelik olduğu gerekçesiyle angloamerikan barış önerilerine karşı çıktı. ayrıca, iktisadi emperyalizmi ve ırkçı önyargıları ortadan kaldırmayı amaçlayan uluslararası bir örgütün oluşturulamayacağını savunarak bu yöndeki girişimleri şiddetle eleştirdi. daha sonra prens unvanından dolayı girdiği soylular meclisi'nde, meclisin yapısında ve soyluluk düzeninde reform yapılmasını savundu. faşizme karşı çıktı ve ordunun dışişlerine karışmasını önelemek amacıyla genelkurmayın yeniden düzenlenmesini istedi. parlamenter siyasal yapının güçlendirilmesine yönelik bir mücadele yürüttü. mançurya'da çin'e karşı başlatılan (1931) savaşın olası sonuçlarını önceden görerek, siyaset adamlarının japon ordu mekanizmasını bütünüyle değiştirmeleri gerektiğini vurguladı. soylular meclisi'nde bir süre başkan yardımcılığı yaptıktan sonra, 1933'te başkanlığa atandı.
  
  sainoci'nin tavsiyesi üzerine imparatorun 1936'da kendisine önerdiği başbakanlık görevini önce geri çevirdiyse de, haziran 1937'de bütün ulusun desteğini kazanmayı hedefleyen partiler üstü bir kabine oluşturmayı kabul etti. ordunun ılımlı bazı isteklerini yerine getirirken, aşırı eğilimli subayları denetim altında tutmaya çalıştı. uluslararası sorunları hakkaniyet kurallarına göre çözmeyi ve içerideki sürtüşme ve uzlaşmazlıkları gidermeyi amaçlayan bir program benimsedi.
  
  temmuz'da çin ve japon birliklerinin pekin yakınlarında giriştiği çarğışmanın ardından, iki ülke arasında açıkça ilan edilmeyen geniş çaplı bir savaş başladı. çatışmayı durdurmaya yönelik çeşitli girişimlerden sonuç alamayan konoe, ocak 1939'da başbakanlıktan çekilmek zorunda kaldı. daha sonra özel danışma kurulu'nun başkanlığına atandı, ayrıca hiranuma kiiçiro'nun kabinesinde görev aldı.
  
  konoe'nin ilk kabinesini uğraştıran ana konulardan biri hükümetle ordu arasındaki yetki uyuşmazlığı olmuştu. ordunun denetim altına alınması ve savaşın sonuçlandırılması için ülke düzeyinde örgütlü siyasi bir güce dayanacak bir hükümetin gerektiğini gören konoe, bu nitelikte bir kitle hareketi geliştirmek amacıyla haziran 1940'ta özel danışma kurulu başkanlığından istifa etti. ama planını tam olarak gerçekleştiremeden ikinci kez başbakanlığa atandı. halkın desteklediği, kitlesel bir örgüt tasarısı ise aynı yıl içinde imparatorluk yönetimine yardım birliği'nin kurulmasıyla gerçekleşti.
  
  japonya eylül 1940'ta almanya ve italya ile üçlü pakt adıyla askeri bir ittifak oluşturdu. konoe birleşik krallık ve abd ile ilişkilerin gittikçe bozulduğu bir ortamda, çin-japon çatışmasının genişlemesini ve abd'nin savaşa katılmasını önelemeye çalıştı. nisan 1941'de de sscb ile bir saldırmazlık antlaşması imzaladı. japon-abd ilişkilerinin daha da bozulması ve japonya'nın abd tarafından kuşatılması üzerine, çin-japon çatışmasını ancak abd'nin arabuluculuğuyla çözülebileceği sonucuna vardı. bu nedenle nisan 1941'den başlayarak bütün ağırlığını japon-abd görüşmelerine verdi ve abd başkanı franklin d. roosevelt'le görüşebilmenin yollarını aradı. bu görüşmelere karşı çıkan dışişleri bakanı matsuoka yosuke'yi hükümet dışında bırakmak amacıyla temmuzda üçüncü kabinesini kurdu. ama savaş bakanı hideki tojo ile beliren görüş ayrılıkları yüzünden ekimde istifa etti.
  
  aralık 1941'de japonya'nın pearl harbor'a yaptığı baskının ardından savaşın genişlemesiyle gözetim altına alınan konoe, etkin siyasetten uzaklaşmaya zorlandı. 1944'te toco hükümetini düşürmek amacıyla önde gelen başka siyaset adamlarıyla işbirliğine girişti. savaştan sonra, 1945'te higaşikuni hükümetinde içişleri bakanı yardımcısı oldu. aynı yıl savaş suçlusu olduğu iddiasıyla abd işgal kuvvetlerince hakkında tutuklama kararı alındı. ifade vereceği gün olan 16 aralık'ta zehir içerek intihar etti.
• japonya'yı ikinci dünya savaşına sokan ve bu sebeple japonlar tarafından en kötü anılan eski japonya başbakanı. hideki tojo'den bile bu kadar nefret etmiyorlar.
• fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war
  
  silinir milinir, ilistireyim suraya:
  
  --- spoiler ---
  
  ı.
  on june 4, 1937, prime minister fumimaro konoe created his first
  cabinet to succeed that of senjuro hayashi. fumimaro konoe’s background
  as a member of a noble clan close to the japanese imperial family made
  him a strong favorite of genro kinmochi saionji. konoe, 46 years old,
  made a young, handsome prime minister. he projected a fresh, rational, and
  dynamic image, and was liked by the military, political parties of both the
  left and the right, and the japanese populace as well.
  on the day he created his cabinet, konoe announced his wish to
  lessen internal discord and friction. he vowed to promote international
  righteousness and social justice in his tenure . a year earlier as a matter of
  fact, after the 2-26 ıncident , the saionji petitioned the emperor to ask
  konoe to form a cabinet, but he turned it down, citing health reasons. a
  year later, he had no choice but to accept the appointment, despite his
  unwillingness to assume the post of the prime minister .
  konoe later wrote in his diary:“basically, ı know which direction
  the japanese nation should go. ı’ll do my best to insist on that road. to
  achieve this, it is necessary to suppress the aggressive and irrational
  military sector. but ı will listen to their petitions so long as they are
  reasonable.” this shows that at that time, the military had already become a
  headache for the japanese people.
  a month and three days after his inauguration as prime minister, the
  marco polo bridge ıncident occurred, an event which later triggered the
  pacific war and eventually led to japan’s defeat. ın this paper, a
  comprehensive narrative of fumimaro konoe’s involvement in the
  sino-japanese war will be made, especially his role in the war and its
  significance.
  ıı.
  on the evening of july 7, a company of japanese soldiers were taking
  drills near the marco polo bridge. after the exercises, as they prepared to
  return to their barracks, they were fired upon. a roll call showed that one
  18 soldier went missing. a report was sent to their superiors. soon, colonel
  takuro matsui, director of ıntelligence stationed in peiping, made a phone
  call to takutaro sakurai, adviser to the hopei political affairs commission.
  the latter met in person with general chien, teh-chun, commissioner of
  the hopei political affairs commission and vice commander of the 29th
  corps. ıt was agreed that both sides refrain from further complicating the
  incident.
  news about the incident reached the japanese central government early
  morning of the following day. a meeting attended by representatives from
  the army ministry, the foreign ministry, and the navy ministry decided
  “not to further complicate matters and to resolve the issue quickly through
  local negotiations.” furthermore, directives were given to the japanese
  army stationed in tienjin.
  the konoe cabinet convened a provisional meeting on the morning of
  july 9, during which it decided to support the army ministry’s position not
  to blow up the matter. ın reality, however, the war was getting worse. on
  this issue, konoe later said:
  as the china incident was erupting, my cabinet, as well as the army,
  advocated not to make matters worse. but things went the other way. ıt
  continued to escalate….ı (later) asked kanji ıshihara, the director of
  military operations, why despite his support for this principle, as well as
  government backing for it, the situation still went out of hand? ıshihara
  responded: we were fooled by those who had voiced support but secretly
  planned for an escalation of the situation. these people cooked up their
  plans in the army and in the troubled location itself. at least, the
  chief-of-staff agreed to support the resolution, but ministers hajime
  sugiyama and yoshiziro umezu of the army ministry were ambivalent.
  the governor-general of korea, general jiro minami, and the commander
  officer in korea, general koiso kuniaki, even publicly called for the
  government to “do it to the very end” in their written proposals. for this
  reason, conflicts of opinion often occurred in upper-echelon government
  fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 19
  meetings.
  according to konoe’s experience, the reason why the marco polo
  bridge ıncident grew worse was the rift between the military and the
  government. the government couldn’t take a hand in military affairs, much
  less intervene with military directives. ın turn, the army ministry could not
  impose control on the local army. for this, konoe said with regret:“ınstead
  of saying that the cabinet exercises no control over the military
  (constitutionally, the cabinet and the supreme command are totally
  independent of one another), it would be more fitting to say that the army
  leaders exercise no power over the army itself. ”
  because the prime minister was kept in the dark on the status of the war
  and its motives, he could not properly set his diplomatic and fiscal policies.
  he wrote the emperor for help, requesting that the cabinet be informed
  beforehand on matters handled by the supreme command. the emperor
  responded saying that the military refused to discuss war matters in a
  cabinet meeting attended by ministers from various political parties. ınstead,
  the emperor would relay information to the prime minister and the foreign
  minister, but they could only listen without giving any opinion.
  fumimaro konoe ardently wished for an early solution to the marco
  polo bridge ıncident. he even tried kanji ıshihara’s suggestion to
  personally meet with chiang kai-shek in nanking for a political solution of
  the issue.
  ın his notes, konoe writes: not long after the marco polo bridge
  ıncident, ı recall secretary ting of ambassador chiang tsuo-pin’s office
  told me to contact ryusuke miyazaki and teisuke akiyama if there was
  something to discuss. without a personal meeting with chiang kai-shek,
  we could not prevent further deterioration of the situation. ı got in touch
  with akiyama and it was decided that we send miyazaki. we obtained
  permission from the army minister, general sugiyama, and quickly
  dispatched miyazaki to nanking. but before he could board the ship in
  kobe, miyazaki was seized by the military police. akiyama, too, was
  20 «?????»????????
  arrested. conditions became complicated. when asked why the military
  police acted to disrupt the plan he previously approved of, general
  sugiyama answered evasively. from this, it is evident that konoe was
  genuinely interested in resolving the conflict with the nationalist
  government. meanwhile, the military headquarter’s chief-of-staff had set
  plans to send 15 divisions to china from mid july to mid-august, and had
  set a budget of 2.5 to 3 billion yen for the operations. ın fact, by the end of
  september, japanese forces in china had reached the equivalent of 15
  divisions.
  japan’s attack on china was conducted on three fronts: ınner mongolia,
  northern china and southern china. the kanto army took control of ınner
  mongolia and later established the mongolia-sinkiang administration. the
  northern china army conquered hopei, shanhsi and shantung, then
  established the “republic of china provisional government” (with wang
  ke-min as leader). ın central china, with shanghai as focal point, three
  divisions were mobilized, but strong resistance from the chinese army led
  to massive losses. three more divisions were dispatched from northern
  china to form the 10th army, which landed in the gulf of hangchou. this
  was joined by the 16th division sent to shanghai from northern china and
  which landed at the lower reaches of the yangtze near paimaokou.
  gradually, the chinese line of resistance collapsed, followed by a full
  retreat. the nationalist government slowly moved inland to the wuhan
  cities and chungking.
  actually, the japanese government, especially in terms of how konoe
  handled the matter, bore the greatest responsibility when it came to japan’s
  invasion of china and the war’s subsequent deterioration. on july 11, the
  five major ministers met with the cabinet to decide what war strategy to
  adopt. from dusk of july 11, konoe called representatives from the diet,
  the nobility, important figures in the finance industry, and the mass media
  for consultation in his official residence. he personally announced the
  japanese government’s decision. two days later on july 13, konoe invited
  fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 21
  representatives from the industrial sector and major magazine publishers for
  a meeting, requesting their full support. soon, japanese dailies were
  blustering about the chastisement of china, thus giving the hardliners the
  upper hand. this played a role in the irreversible deterioration of the
  situation. no wonder, mamoru shigemitsu, a former foreign minister,
  labled konoe as “a most suitable puppet of the military.” he was “just an
  official who adapted his ways to the changing times.” ıtaro ıshii, who was
  then director of the east asia bureau of the japanese foreign ministry, had
  the following view of konoe: “he knew how to tell the good from the bad,
  but lacked the courage to choose what is good. he always gave in to
  external pressure. that’s why the hardliners gained the upperhand in the
  sino-japanese conflict, which went on and on. he was disloyal to his own
  principles. having a person like that as prime minister in a crisis period,
  what would you expect ?” “prince konoe was just too superficial.”
  ııı.
  as the japanese continued their relentless attack on the chinese
  mainland, the british, who enjoyed great power in china, attempted to
  broker peace between the two countries. but the japanese army rejected the
  idea. ınstead, the germans, through osker paul trautmann(1877-1950)
  acted as intermediary for talks towards ending the war.
  on november 2, the japanese foreign minister, kooki hirota, first
  made a peace proposal through the german ambassador to japan, herbert
  von dirksen (1882-1955). trautmann, the german ambassador to china,
  received a copy of the proposal from von dirksen. on november 5, he
  relayed the terms of the japanese on two conditions: (1) the germans must
  mediate to the very end, and (2) japanese administrative sovereignty in
  northern china must be maintained.
  the japanese, however, seeing that they had the upperhand in the war,
  and in fact, were planning to capture nanking, added more preconditions.
  dirksen was informed of the additional conditions on december 22.
  trautmann relayed the message to the chinese government on december
  22 «?????»????????
  26, hoping that the nationalist government could respond before the fifth
  or sixth of january in the new year. the japanese government and its
  military celebrated the new year in good spirits, anticipating good news
  from the chinese. on january 13, the chinese rather than give a formal
  response, made contact to inquire about concrete details of the japanese
  demands. the japanese took that as a delaying tactic adopted by the
  chinese who had no real desire to negotiate. on january 16, their
  declaration to the chinese inquiry was “no. we will never again deal with
  the nationalist government. "
  people in japan, including the former prime minister, reijiro
  wakatsuki, criticized the japanese declaration. konoe, in fact, knew that
  the declaration was a blunder. ın his notes, konoe write: evidently, this
  declaration was a big mistake. ı personally accept that it was a failure. to
  rectify the mistake of having made this declaration, ı tried to resume our
  relations with chungking. we used various means, but to no avail…
  the cabinet was re-organized on may 26 and a declaration called
  “new order”was made on november 3 as a way to rectify the previous
  declaration refusing to deal with the nationalist government. konoe gave
  orders to the new foreign minister, kazushige ugaki, to do everything
  possible to abolish the said declaration. considering the new declaration
  an insult, the nationalist government became even more resolute in its
  struggle against the japanese. there is no question about that.
  ın the new cabinet, most of the attention was given to the position of
  army minister. konoe was not on good terms with hajime sugiyama, the
  former army minister. ıt was generally considered that replacing sugiyama
  was crucial to the solution of the sino-japanese conflict. with much effort,
  konoe finally succeeded in appointing seishiro ıtagaki, then commander of
  the fifth division stationed in the hsuchou front. konoe thought that
  ıtagaki was against further deterioration of the conflict. little did he know
  that ıtagaki, too, was a puppet, much like sugiyama was. he listened to his
  subordinates, a fact that later greatly disappointed the prime minister.
  fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 23
  ıt turned out that konoe had no idea about ıtagaki’s thinking and
  personality. ın appointing ıtagaki as army minister, konoe was merely
  swayed by the man’s reputation and by rumors he heard about him. he was
  therefore very disappointed when they personally met to discuss matters.
  on the third day of the meetings, the secretary of the interior minister,
  koohei mastsudaira made the following comments to kumao harada, then
  secretary of saionji: “this is confidential, but his majesty told the ınterior
  minister that ‘konoe told him he had met with ıtagaki, and he realized that
  ıtagaki was stupid.’ he also laughingly said that ‘konoe will change
  soon.’”
  ın fact, after ıtagaki assumed his post, the war in china turned for the
  worse. the japanese attacked hankow and canton. on this, konoe writes
  in his diary: “ı have the vaguest idea where opinion in the army really
  comes from. the cabinet is kept in the dark by a marshall who has yet to
  show his true colors.” he told people that he “no longer wishes to continue
  acting as a puppet.”
  konoe, desperate about ıtagaki, was even more dissatisfied with the
  new interior minister, admiral nobumasa suetsugu. konoe had selected
  suetsugu to counter the influence of the right wing. however, the newly
  sworn-in suetsugu acted like the virtual spokesman of the right wing. ıt was
  not possible for the cabinet to suppress the rightists. hapless, konoe wrote
  to the emperor: “suetsugu is the center of trouble in the cabinet.” konoe
  wanted to resign as a way out. he told his friend kumao harada:
  “people overestimated me. how could ı have become the prime
  minister? ıt’s just too presumptious.”
  the new foreign minister, kazushige ugaki, worked hard towards
  forging peace with the nationalist government. he hoped to see peace talks
  held before the japanese army attacked hankow. on june 26, the japanese
  consul-general in hong kong, toyoichi nakamura, sent a wire, saying that
  a confidant of kung hsiang-hsi wanted to meet with ugaki for possible
  peace negotiations and asked for instructions. ugaki personally drafted
  24 «?????»????????
  directives for nakamura, telling the latter to continue negotiations and
  asking him to return to japan to discuss matters. ugaki decided that after
  talks had progressed, kung hsiang-hsi could secretly travel to kyushu for a
  face-to-face meeting with ugaki.
  at this point in time, the japanese government was drafting plans for
  the establishment of a central body —the “ınstitute on china”(koain)—to
  be subordinated under the office of the prime minister as a way to handle
  the sino-japanese conflict. once established, this institute would not only
  reduce the power of the foreign minister, but also set up an office in the
  occupied territory to handle local political matters. to show disapproval for
  this plan, ugaki submitted his resignation on september 29. konoe
  expressed surprise, not knowing the reason for the resignation. this shows
  that konoe’s revamp of the cabinet was useless.
  ındeed, the new cabinet was getting worse each day. ıt was, therefore,
  no exaggeration when saionji’s secretary, harada, said “the current cabinet
  works much like a federation.”
  faced with such a difficult situation, the konoe cabinet finally
  dissolved on january 4, 1939. konoe himself had the following words for
  his first cabinet:
  ı have made a conclusion regarding my tenure as prime minister over
  the last year or so: my cabinet had no support from the right or the left and
  had no public opinion to rely on.
  since the saito cabinet, the duke of saionji has always, in principle,
  been opposed to the policies adopted by the military. but the cabinets,
  forced by the trends, had to follow a restricted middle road. this was
  especially true in the cases of the supreme command and the state affairs,
  which alienated each another. the bridge between them was the
  ambiguous army minister, who himself was constantly trying to stifle the
  cabinet. the cabinet is itself state affairs, and is thus a very weak thing
  manipulated by the supreme command. people’s lives and diplomatic
  policies have no relationship whatsoever with popular will and public
  fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 25
  opinion. the military is loomed over by the hazy, illusive shadow of the
  supreme command, who decides, revises and abandons at will. ı have, for
  several times, tried to learn from the army minister the real color of the
  shadowy military sector. ı did it, to some extent, to appease my political
  conscience and shoulder my political responsibilities. back then, ı asked
  ugaki to take charge of the foreign ministry, hoping for a change in our
  china policy. but his china policy was altered by the military, resulting in
  its defeat. ın the face of the military’s attack, and in order for me to take a
  greater responsibility in the sino-japanese conflict, ı gradually shook off
  and abandoned the middle road. with public opinion behind me, ı tried my
  best to suppress the ambitions of the military.
  today, it is impossible to suppress the military using powers resting in
  the different political parties. for this reason, ı can only make the following
  conclusion: only by the establishment of a people’s organization different
  from already existing parties, one that can take root in the civilian society,
  and one that can support the government, can it be possible to suppress the
  military, and eventually, resolve the japan-china conflict. ı resigned with
  my first cabinet with the idea of studying how to form such an organization.
  ıv.
  just when foreign minister ugaki was meeting with kung hsiang-hsi
  about peace negotiations, rumors went around that sadaaki kagesa, bureau
  chief of the army ministry, had asked the nationalist foreign ministry’s
  asian affairs director, kao tsung-wu, to travel to tokyo for a secret
  mission with the goal of luring wang ching-wei out of hiding. konoe had
  done his best about wang ching-wei, but he had no plans of asking wang
  to form a new government. ınstead, he hoped that wang could act as a
  bridge in peace talks with the nationalist government.
  according to the accounts of akira kazami, secretary-general of the
  first konoe cabinet, if not for konoe’s work on wang, he could have
  tendered his resignation as early as november of 1938. kazami was asked
  to draft the resignation statement around the end of october. he gave it to
  26 «?????»????????
  konoe on november 3. but the resignation was not tendered until january
  of the following year. he was waiting until wang ching-wei had fled
  chungking.
  after he stepped down, konoe became the head of the sumitsuin,
  then joined the cabinet of kiichiro hiranuma as minister without portfolio,
  an arrangement that allowed him to continue his work on wang. ıt is said
  that on june 14, 1939, konoe met with wang, who was then visiting japan,
  for a discussion that lasted three and a half hours. konoe started by
  mentioning how his father, atsumaro konoe, was concerned with the china
  issue and his relationship with sun yat-sen. wang ching-wei was so moved
  he said: prince konoe is an outstanding politician. with people like him,
  japan faces a bright future.
  on july 8, 1938 at nine in the morning, konoe went to see the
  director of the asian affairs of the nationalist foreign ministry, kao
  tsung-wu, who arrived in japan in secret and on his own accord to better
  understandconditions there. they talked for about an hour in konoe’s
  residence. also in attendance was shigeharu matsumoto. konoe said: “my
  mission now is to prevent the two countries from repeating this tragedy in
  the future,” he expressed disapproval of autonomy for eastern hopei. he
  said: “japan basically wants to help china. we hope to cooperate. we
  absolutely have no intention to interfere with chinese sovereignty.”
  viewed from various perspectives, it appears that konoe had neither
  imperialist ambitions nor a desire to invade china.
  ı have mentioned earlier that after he stepped down, konoe wanted to
  organize a political party backed by popular will. he believed that only then
  could the military be restrained and the sino-japanese conflict be resolved.
  his close associates, led by akira kazami, yorichike arima, and kisaburo
  kisya, thus went about campaigning for the formation of the new party. ın
  konoe’s mind, the ideal new government should consist of existing parties
  and the newly rising political entity. realizing that konoe was a political
  heavyweight, many political parties disbanded one after another, to join the
  fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 27
  bandwagon. konoe was surprised and displeased. konoe once told
  kisaburo kisya:
  what a disaster! everybody’s calling for the formation of a new party.
  but ı wonder just how many of them truly see the need for a new party?
  our goal is to avoid direct conflict with the military. by organizing a
  political party, we hope to use political power to somehow put a check on
  the military’s excesses. however, among proponents of a new party, not a
  few want to organize a party that has close relationship with the military or
  that even advocate military rule. ıt would be quite acceptable if they were
  ordinary members of the parliament, but many of the new party cadres
  harbor the same views. ı cannot just accept them. the rightist camp is
  spreading rumors that konoe wants to organize a new party following the
  styles of shogun politics. this morning, harada (kumao) contacted me by
  telephone to tell me that these people will distribute leaflets to protest the
  formation of the new party in tokyo. of course, ı know that the military is
  behind that. the louder our voices are, the more vehement the opposition
  will become. what ı worry about most is this—do the cadres of the new
  party have enough courage to resist?
  konoe abhorred those who just go with the current for their own
  vested interests, not for the country’s. much more those opportunists who
  wished to tag along with him for a possible position later on. for this reason,
  he became more cautious in campaigning for the new party. ın response to a
  newspaper article alleging that he wanted a political comeback, konoe
  made the following declaration through the mass media:“establishing a
  new political system is necessary." however, he added that it would be
  deceiving the people if the establishment of such a system would merely
  mean the disbanding of political parties and their regrouping. he called for
  an awakening of the people whose organization and ideas must keep up
  with the times. merely currying the favor of the militarists would be
  meaningless. “ıf we have to always listen to the military, we might as well
  opt for a military government.”
  28 «?????»????????
  after his resignation, konoe was succeeded by kiichiro hiranuma
  (january 5, 1935), nobuyuki abe (august 30, 1939),and mitsumasa
  yonai(january 16, 1940). on july 17, 1940, konoe was called to form a
  cabinet for the second time.
  before his appointment, he expressed his views during a conference
  of elders:the new prime minister must have a thorough understanding of
  military affairs. he said that he himself lacked this and that he was
  psychologically unprepared to accept the position. but he was later
  convinced to accept the appointment after kooichi kido, ex-prime minister
  reijiro wakatsuki, kiichiro hiranuma, senjuro hayashi, keisuke okada,
  and the president of the private council, yoshimitsu hara, all voiced support
  for him.
  soon after the formation of his second cabinet, the “basic national
  policy outline” was passed on july 26. among others, all designation
  bearing theterm “teikoku” was changed into “kokoku. ”the term
  “hakkoichiu” started to be used. simiarly, the name “east asian new
  order” was revised as “greater east asian new order.”
  one of the most important achievements of the second konoe cabinet
  was the signing of a pact with germany and ıtaly. foreign minister
  yoosuke matsuoka insisted on signing the pact for the following reasons:(1)
  ınsufficient understanding of the military strength of germany, (2) as a
  way to counteract pressure from the united states and great britain, (3) for
  an early solution to the japanese-chinese conflict, (4) yielding to pressure
  from the army, and (5) japan needs for german support in improving
  diplomatic relations with the soviet union. matsuoka believed that the pact
  with germany and ıtaly, aided by the russians, would force the americans
  to capitulate. but instead it resulted in a war with the americans and the
  british. on the first day of the war with the u.s., matsuoka, with tears in
  his eyes, told his friend, yoshie saito:“the tripartite pact was the biggest
  blunder of my life."
  on march 30, 1940, the wang puppet regime was formally
  fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 29
  established in nanking. at this time, konoe was still trying to establish
  contact with the chungking administration in his hope for a peaceful
  negotiation with the nationalist government. two cases in point are works
  done by sung tzu-liang and chien yung-ming, both of which ended in
  failure. this explains why the japanese government delayed recognition of
  the wang puppet regime for eight months.
  after the formation of the new konoe cabinet, an imperial
  headquarters-government meeting was held on july 27 to adopt important
  national strategies that would decide the fate of japan—the main outlines
  for handling world situation and vicissitudes—whose major points
  included seeking a solution to the sino-japanese conflict, the southward
  thrust of the empire (including the use of force ), strengthening of
  cooperation with germany and ıtaly, and a rapid mending of state relations
  with the soviet union.
  provision 1 of the main outlines says: to solve the china conflict,
  joint efforts by political and military means shall be adopted, including
  stopping all third-country assistance to chiang. all necessary measures
  shall be adopted to speedily force the chungking regime to its knees. ın
  other words, konoe had at this point already made the following conclusion:
  without mediation from the united states, solution to the chinese problem
  would be nowhere in sight, for which reason he decided that it was
  necessary to start negotiating with the americans.
  but talks with the americans didn’t go on smoothly for a host of
  reasons, including miscalculations by foreign minister matsuoka, and a
  strong american position. matusoka, who prided himself as the “japanese
  hitler,” made konoe appear helpless. matsuoka had not the slightest
  inkling that war was about to erupt between the germans and soviets (it
  started on june 22) and in fact, believed that “amity” between the soviet
  union and the japanese, ıtalian and german bloc would dissuade the
  americans from joining the war. he was for an all-out war with the united
  states if necessary. the showa emperor, worried about a war with the
  30 «?????»????????
  americans, suggested to the interior minister, kooichi kido, to replace the
  foreign minister. besides, the americans had been blaming matsuoka for
  the deadlock in the americans-japanese talks. konoe, who was responsible
  for the appointment of matsuoka, and for that matter, for the fuss the latter
  had created, tendered his resignation together with his cabinet on july 16,
  1941.
  v.
  on july 17, after a conference attended by important ministers, the
  japanese emperor requested konoe to form a new cabinet. the minister of
  the navy, teijiro toyoda, took over as foreign minister. the third konoe
  cabinet was thus formally seated on july 18.
  to solve the diplomatic impasse with the americans, konoe, at one
  point in time, even considered making a personal trip to the united states
  for talks with president roosevelt. he obtained approval from the navy and
  was ready to send a coded telegram asking for the emperor’s permission.
  however, tojyo hideki, minister of the army, demanded that the
  americans concede as a precondition for his approval. the americans
  refused, rendering a u.s. trip by konoe impossible.
  on september 6, a meeting with the emperor was held to discuss the
  “pointers for the ımplementation of ımperial national policies.” among
  other things, the meeting discussed negotiations with the americans and the
  british, and completion of war preparations before the end of october. ın
  other words, if diplomatic talks with the americans failed to meet japanese
  demands by the middle of october, japan would be ready to declare war on
  the united states, britain, and the netherlands.
  a day before the meeting, emperor hirohito met with prime minister
  konoe, chief of the general staff sugiyama, and chief of the naval
  general staff osami nagano. konoe’s diary has the following records of
  this meeting: “the emperor asked chief of the general staff sugiyama:
  ‘how much time would the army really need to resolve a
  japanese-american war?’ sugiyama answered: ‘ın the south seas, three
  fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 31
  months or so would be necessary.’ then the emperor asked sugiyama: ‘ı
  recall that you were the army minister when war with china erupted. that
  time, you said that ‘one month or so would be enough to solve the
  conflict.’ ıt’s been four years now, and no solution is within sight. the
  chief of the general staff stammered and defended himself by saying that
  china has a large territory and that the original war plan could not be
  followed. the emperor told him in a loud voice: ‘you say that china has a
  large territory. the pacific ocean covers a much larger space. on what
  basis do you say three months?’ unable to respond, the general remained
  silent, his head bowed low….”
  konoe became increasingly worried about the diplomatic impasse
  with the americans, whose suspicions about the japanese were deep-seated.
  as charles beard (1874-1948) said, japan has a long record of “barbaric
  behavior,” and that konoe, no different from the “bloodthirsty militarists,”
  wants to deceive the americans.
  under such circumstances, konoe summoned army minister tojyo,
  navy minister oikawa, foreign minister toyoda, and planning ınstitute
  president teiichi suzuki to his official residence, the tekigaiso, on october
  12, his birthday, for a final meeting on the fate of the war. the meeting
  went on for four hours.
  on this occasion, the words of tojyo carried the heaviest weight and
  were the most decisive.
  tojyo: when negotiating with the americans, we cannot give in on the
  issue of stationing troops (the issue of the japanese army garrisoned
  in china). ıf the americans do not yield on this, our negotiations
  will be doomed to failure.
  oikawa: we are now at a crossroads. shall we decide to go to war or
  continue diplomatic talks? ıf we choose to negotiate, then we must
  stop preparation for war and devote ourselves fully to the
  negotiations. but this must be done only if there is hope for
  success in the negotiations. after two to three months of talks, we
  32 «?????»????????
  cannot stop in the middle of them. ı’m in favor or letting the prime
  minister decide.
  konoe: what is the opinion of the foreign minister?
  toyoda: because we have an opponent, ı can’t be absolutely confident.
  tojyo & oikawa: ıf we delay for a long time only to regret it and opt for
  war, it would bring lots of difficulties. now is the time to
  decide
  konoe: there are risks involved either way. the question is which way
  brings the greater risk. ıf we have to make a decision now, ı’d
  choose to continue negotiating.
  tojyo: ıs the foreign minister confident? what the foreign minister has just
  said will not convince the supreme command.
  konoe: comparing possible results of the two, ı’d choose to negotiate.
  tojyo: that’s just a subjective view of the prime minister. ıt is still
  unconvincing to the supreme command.
  oikawa: ı agree.
  tojyo: the prime minister does not have to make such an early conclusion.
  ı want to hear the view of the foreign minister.
  toyoda: that depends upon the conditions. now, the most difficult issue is
  the stationing of troops. ıf the army minister does not give in
  totally, negotiation would be doomed to failure. ıf we yield a bit,
  there is some hope for the talk to succeed.
  tojyo: the stationing of troops is the very life of the army. we absolutely
  cannot give in on that.
  konoe: ıs there a way to call it by any other way? we do it on the surface
  the way the americans want it but in real terms, we continue
  stationing our troops as before. ın any case, ı will surely opt for
  diplomatic negotiations. ıf we go to war, let it not be said that ı am
  responsible for it.
  tojyo: didn’t we already decide to go to war if negotiations do not hold any
  promise in our meeting with the emperor on september 6? you
  fumimaro konoe and the sino-japanese war 33
  were present at that meeting too, mr. prime minister. ı don’t quite
  understand when you say you cannot be held responsible for it.
  konoe : what ı mean is that ı feel more confident about the negotiations. ıf
  you ask me to choose something ı’m less confident about, ı cannot
  be held responsible for it. the decision during that meeting was
  made on the premise that there is no hope for success in the
  negotiations. ıt’s not that we see no hope in holding talks now. we
  are confident about it.1
  on september 14, before the cabinet meeting was held, konoe again
  summoned tojyo. he wanted tojyo to be pragmatic enough to agree to a
  troop withdrawal. he told the army minister that “the conflict with china
  has dragged on for four years and japan is now on the brink of an uncertain
  war” and that no matter what, he couldn’t let that happen. tojyo was firm in
  his disapproval. he said that “it is a clash of personality.” the helpless
  konoe told his close aides: “the army wants to wage a war that is destined
  to fail. the navy is not confident and the emperor himself is against war.
  the army minister refuses to listen. he’s a real dumb fool.”2
  failing to reach a consensus with tojyo and facing the army’s demand for him to step down,
  konoe finally tendered his resignation on october 16, 1941, citing as
  reason a clash of opinion with the minister on diplomatic negotiations with
  the americans. the third konoe cabinet died a natural death three months
  after it was formed.
  vı.
  the next cabinet was formed by hideki tojyo himself. he also
  appointed himself minister of the army and minister of the interior. later,
  he also took the post of the chief of the general staff. this was
  unprecedented in japanese history. on december 8, konoe immediately
  returned to tokyo from hakone after hearing radio broadcasts about the
  declaration of war against the united states. he told morisada hosokawa3
  who was then visiting him: “ıt’s a disaster. ı have an inkling that japan will
  lose the war at a great expense. this temporary situation (winning with
  glorious victory) will last for only two to three months at most.”4
  as konoe predicted, japan’s victory was short-lived. since the battle
  of midway (june 5, 1942), the americans had gained control of the pacific
  war. on june 19, 1944, saipan fell into u.s. hands. on october20, the
  americans conquered leyte ısland in the philippines. then on november
  11, b29 bombers bombarded tokyo. on november 10, wang ching-wei
  died at the nagoya ımperial university hospital.
  konoe was received by the emperor on february 14, 1945. he told the
  emperor three things:(1) japan will lose the war, (2) he was afraid that
  communism would rise after the defeat, and (3) he was worried about the
  reformist movement in the army.
  konoe had been plotting in secret with reijiro wakatsuki, keisuke
  okada, and kiichiro hiranuma to oust tojyo. nobuhito takamatsnomiya,
  brother of emperor hirohito, had once thought of getting rid of tojyo.5
  however, the emperor trusted tojyo,6 for which reason konoe once said:
  emperor hirohito was like a puppet of kido. all suggestions made to him
  were divulged to kido, who, in turn, immediately informed tojyo.7 kido
  and tojyo were good friends, and the latter did not want the emperor to
  receive too much “noise.” this explains why, in more than three years, not
  even konoe could see the emperor unaccompanied.
  when things turned for the worse, emperor hirohito again summoned
  konoe. he was assigned to go and convince the soviet union to broker
  peace. konoe’s plane and entourage were ready to depart but the soviet
  union had, by then, decided to declare war on japan. the soviets sounded
  evasive and didn’t directly respond to konoe’s request for a visit. on july
  26, the allies made the potsdam declaration. on august 6, the u.s. dropped
  the first atomic bomb on hiroshima. two days later, the soviet union
  declared war against japan. on august 15, the japanese surrendered
  unconditionally.
  
  on november 22, the three-time prime minister konoe took
  responsibility for his failure to solve the sino-japanese conflict and save
  relations with the united sates by making a humiliating apology.
  a warrant for his arrest was issued by the allied forces on december 6.
  konoe, respected as a prince, refused arrest. ın the early morning of
  december 6, the day of the scheduled arrest, he committed suicide by
  taking poison. he was 55.
  
  the night before his suicide, konoe talked until about two in the
  morning with his second son, michitaka. michitaka gave his father a pencil
  and asked him to write down a few things. konoe jotted down what he felt
  at that moment:
  i have made many political mistakes since the chinese conflict. ı feel
  responsible for them but ı cannot accept the idea of being tried as a
  so-called war criminal in an american court of law. ı feel especially
  responsible for the china conflict, and its resolution was a greatest mission.
  --- spoiler ---